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Abstract
This paper discusses the design of the legal and regulatory framework for using arti-
ficial intelligence (AI) in the financial services markets to enhance access to finance 
(financial inclusion). The author argues that the development of AI should continue 
to adhere to the regulatory objectives of market safety, consumer protection, and 
market integrity. However, to ensure equality and fairness, access to finance should 
be made a clear policy choice. In the first part, the author discusses how AI can lead 
to systemic risks and market manipulation on trading platforms. For example, by 
examining the use of algorithms for trading on the capital market, the author dis-
cerns the regulatory objectives and the possible methods of regulation for peer-to-
peer platforms. In the second part, the author discusses how the use of AI to provide 
consumers with investment advice, such as financial advice provided from robo-
advisers, can close the investment advisory gap and provide consumers with access 
to finance. The current regime does not provide adequate protection to financial con-
sumers in this regard. In the third part, the author discusses how AI can be used as 
a form of RegTech to streamline compliance processes, thereby increasing competi-
tion in financial markets and providing a benefit to consumers. However, this use 
may be in conflict with privacy, data protection, and ethical concerns. The author 
makes policy recommendations and suggests some directions for governance in the 
use of AI in financial services to enhance access to finance. The findings of this 
paper are relevant to research on the future governance of AI in financial services, 
public policy innovation, and urban development.
Keywords AI · Financial services · Access to finance · Investor protection · GDPR · 
Privacy rights
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1.1  Access to Finance
Artificial intelligence (AI) is seen as a threat to employment, as it will take away 
manual jobs.1 This threat is also true for financial services.2 Nutmeg Review in 2017 
revealed that a large proportion of the traditional business of financial advisers is 
threatened by automated services.3 Despite this, the uncertainty that AI brings to 
incumbent operators, consumers, and financial regulators has not stopped invest-
ment in AI FinTech. To strengthen its legitimacy in the financial services sector and 
to gain public acceptance, AI must provide some social benefits. Therefore, access 
to finance,4 also referred to as financial inclusion, should be set as the policy prior-
ity in the regulation of the design, development, and deployment of AI. According 
to the definition given by the Financial Inclusion Report 2018/19, ‘financial inclu-
sion means that individuals, regardless of their background or income, have access 
to useful and affordable financial products and services. This includes products and 
services, as well as transactions and payment systems, and the use of financial tech-
nology.’5 The provision of access to finance should aim to enable those currently 
excluded by the existing systems to participate in the financial markets. To benefit 
from the economic growth, these individuals should have access to capital pools for 
personal or business finance, access to real-time information with the aid of data 
analytics, and have access to a range of investment providers. In this article, the 
author will focus on three aspects of how AI can enhance financial inclusion: (1) 
increasing participation in peer-to-peer (p2p) platforms by providing security for 
them, (2) closing the advisory gap in investment services; and (3) allowing more 
financial outlets to be operated in the financial services sector by reducing their 
operational costs, such as compliance costs.
The paper will discuss the regulatory objectives and methods of regulation in 
these three areas by looking at close parallels. The first is the use of AI in the trading 
platforms for capital optimisation, such as an increase in efficiency, accuracy, and 
the speed of capital optimisation through the foundations of computing capabilities, 
big data and mathematical concepts built by AI and machine learning (ML).6 The 
second is the use of robo-advisers to provide investment services, such as identi-
fying wider sources of available funds for FinTech lending to small and medium-
sized enterprises and clients through AI and ML’s advanced credit scoring.7 And the 




4 Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee (2016).
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the costs involved in the Know Your Consumer processes (‘KYC’). In this way, the 
author will examine how AI-facilitated access to finance can align with current reg-
ulatory objectives and methods of regulation. Whether the provision of this access 
will conflict with other values, such as privacy, data protection, and ethics will also 
be examined.
2  Applications of AI in Finance
2.1  Algorithmic Trading on Regulated Platforms
The UK authorities regard financial technology as an efficient tool to tackle finan-
cial exclusion and also as a way to encourage firms to develop innovative pro-
cesses and thus increase consumer access to the financial services.9 P2p platforms 
have been regarded as providing a more economic way of bringing businesses and 
investors together. Compared with bank saving, p2p platforms offer higher interest 
rates.10 In addition, investments through p2p platforms offer higher liquidity than 
traditional property investments.11 Most importantly, p2p platforms normally split 
capital into several parts for multiple borrowers, thus lowering the risk of incurring 
major losses. Algorithmic trading can be used in p2p platforms to increase access 
to finance, particularly in capital allocation. The tightening of bank lending policies 
followed the financial crisis and p2p lending has become a major player in global 
financial markets. For instance, LendingClub Inc. developed its own platform, rely-
ing on sophisticated algorithms to pair borrowers and investors and also to evaluate 
the attributes of both sides.12 Not only on the p2p lending platforms, it is envisaged 
that algorithms may also be used for secondary securities trading on blockchain-
based trading platforms such as Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). For instance, in early 
2019 the London Stock Exchange (LSE) invested 20 million dollars to Nivaura, a 
blockchain start-up that specialises in fully-automated tokenised bonds recorded on 
a blockchain.13 In April 2019, LSE and Nivaura issued shares with £ 3 million on 
LSE’s test network.14 While traders in the financial markets are using algorithms 
to make gains, the author argues that similar tools and opportunities should also be 
given to investors and consumers. This is a way to provide access to financial mar-
kets. Therefore, algorithms should be made available through market competition. 
Real-time data should also be made available to consumers and investors, rather 
than being an expensive commodity only available to those who can afford it.
However, users need to feel confident that the platforms on which algorithms 
are used are not likely to cause a market crash or to manipulate the market. Market 
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crashes due to human behaviour have occurred in modern capital markets15 such 
as the ‘Dotcom Bubble Burst’ in the 1990s and the 1998 ‘Asian Crash’. AI does 
not reduce the risk of a market crash and may even increase the chances of it hap-
pening.16 This can be seen in the market crash in 2008 for which High Frequency 
Trading (HFT) was considered the cause, or at least a contributing factor.17 Hence, 
the regulation of HFT can provide a blueprint for regulating algorithmic trading on 
a p2p platform.18 HFT is a type of algorithmic trading that has been used for more 
than a decade on trading platforms.19 The reason for its emergence was the market 
liberalisation and market competition that substantially reduced the trading revenues 
of the trading platforms.20 HFT allows trading venues to raise trading fees. It is not 
yet clear if HFT will be used on other trading platforms, such as p2p platforms,21 
to provide the same benefit. The business model on p2p trading platforms may not 
be the same as that on securities trading platforms. Technical obstacles may need 
to be overcome; for instance, the speed on a blockchain-based p2p platform may 
not be sufficient to support HFT.22 However, the lessons learned regarding the risks 
in algorithmic trading provide a good regulatory framework that can be applied to 
provide security for users on the platform.23 HFT, computerised trading controlled 
by algorithms, is a subset of the broader (and older) phenomenon of algorithmic 
trading.24 In essence, algorithmic trading is simply the use of specialised software to 
implement predetermined decision-making rules for the evaluation of market con-
ditions and other data in order to make trading decisions without human involve-
ment.25 Hence, in algorithmic trading, the traders’ computers directly interface 
with trading platforms, placing orders without immediate human intervention. The 
computers observe, at very high frequency, market data and possibly other infor-
mation. Based on a built-in algorithm, trading instructions are sent to the platform, 
often within milliseconds. A variety of algorithms are used for identifying arbitrage 
opportunities; for seeking the optimal execution of large orders at a minimum cost; 
and for seeking to implement longer-term trading strategies.26
22 Andoni et al. (2019).
23 Barrales (2012); McNamara (2016).
24 Government Office for Science (2012).
25 Luca et al. (2011).
26 Dignum (2019), pp 130–136.
15 Jhun et al. (2018).
16 Bank of England and FCA (2019).
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2.2  Market Safety Regulation
The main focus of the regulation of algorithmic trading is market safety to address 
systemic risks caused by algorithmic trading. These include flash crashes, reduced 
liquidity, and herding behaviour.27
2.2.1  Flash Crash
A market crash, predating the involvement of AI, has happened in the capital mar-
kets and the regulations put in place to avoid a recurrence focus primarily on human 
conduct. When machines are involved, systemic risk becomes the main concern, so 
market safety regulation needs to be introduced to provide security. The EU and UK 
regulators have introduced measures to mitigate the risk of a flash crash caused by 
AI. Algorithmic trading can result in a ‘flash crash’, for example, when the with-
drawal of stock orders rapidly amplifies price declines.28 After the flash crash in 
2010,29 the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), alongside the Prudential Reg-
ulation Authority, started closely monitoring HFT. HFT firms were considered to 
have contributed to market instability and to the overall lack of investors’ trust in 
the market.30 In the same effort, the EU regulates HFT activities under the ‘Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive II’31 and the ‘Markets in Financial Instruments 
Regulation’,32 known together as ‘MiFID II and MiFIR’.33 MiFID II has three main 
strands. First, it provides for a new operational regime governing algorithmic trading 
by investment firms.34 Second, it extends its scope to encompass all firms engaging 
in algorithmic trading, in particular, specialist firms that undertake HFT. Third, it 
imposes operational requirements on trading venues, such as exchanges e.g. plat-
forms.35 For instance, circuit breakers, also called shock absorbers, are required for 
trading venues such as exchanges to temporarily halt trading when market prices, 
as indicated by a benchmark index, fall by a certain percentage during a specific 
period.36
Under the first strand, investment firms that engage in algorithmic trading are sub-
ject to a ‘targeted operational regime’.37 They are required to have in place effective 
systems and risk controls to ensure that trading systems are resilient and maintain 
27 Turner (2019); O’Mahony (2015).
28 Mack (2016), p 92; Fitsills (2019), p 4.
29 Trotman (2010).
30 See Barrales (2012), p 1197.
31 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15  May 2014 on markets 
in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU [2014] OJ L 
173/349.
32 Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 [2014] OJ L 173/84.
33 Busch (2016).
34 Moloney (2014), p 528.
35 Moloney (2014), p 529.
36 Definition given by Financial Times Lexicon.
37 Moloney (2014), p 529.
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the appropriate thresholds and limits to prevent incorrect or erroneous orders which 
may create or contribute to a disorderly market.38 In the UK, these algorithmic trad-
ing requirements were implemented through Chapter  7A of the Market Conduct 
Sourcebook.39 The second strand requires that firms must have ‘effective business 
continuity arrangements’ to handle any trading system failure and must ensure that 
systems are fully tested and continuously monitored.40 Third, HFT firms must have 
an emergency ‘kill functionality’, which allows them to cancel all unexecuted orders 
with immediate effect.41 In addition to this organisational requirement, all firms 
must notify the Financial Conduct Authority and the venue’s competent authority 
if the firms engage in any HFT on any EU trading venue.42 Lastly, firms must carry 
out an annual self-assessment and issue a validation report covering such elements 
as governance, the control framework, and overall compliance with the other MiFID 
II requirements.43 Firms are required to identify the algorithm ownership, establish 
testing processes, and identify relevant environmental factors, such as the counter-
parties that use algo-trade.44 They are also required to identify risks and provide 
risk mitigation measures. The Prudential Regulatory Authority has also published 
a consultation paper to accompany these current regulations which focuses on the 
proposed expectations of a firm’s policies for the ‘governance and risk management 
of algorithmic trading’.45 Some countries go further than the EU regulations and 
have adopted measures such as a requirement to hold a licence to operate HFT. In 
Germany, under section 32 of the German Banking Act, HFT firms need to hold a 
licence issued by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority.46
2.2.2  Liquidity Risk and Procyclical Behaviour
To address liquidity risk, HFTs are required to register as market makers.47 A market 
maker is a market participant that buys and sells large amounts of a particular asset 
in order to facilitate liquidity and ensure the smooth running of financial markets.48 
Market makers are obliged to continually quote bid and offer prices, and to guaran-
tee the full sale or absorption of the security at a certain price.49 When the market 
becomes stressed,50 an HFT has an additional duty to ensure liquidity. Market mak-
ers have to protect proposals to purchase and sell stocks at levels corresponding to 
38 Art. 17 of MIFID II; Moloney (2014), p 529.
39 FCA (2018b).
40 FCA 2018b), p 5.
41 FCA (2018b).
42 Section 17(2), MiFID II.
43 FCA (2018b)




48 Shen and Starr (2002).
49 Benos and Wetherilt (2012).
50 Scharpiro (2018); Seidel (2011).
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different price and size thresholds. Market makers have to comply with four different 
elements: to offer the quote at the best price in a specified period of time; to offer 
the quote at prices within the specified period of time from the National Best Bid or 
Proposal; to quote with a minimum dimension and various prices; and to build mar-
kets for a minimum amount of stocks.51 Market makers take the highest trading risk 
to comply with the four elements, and are therefore required to maintain the neces-
sary amount of capital.52 Additionally, if market prices escalate or decrease more 
than a certain amount, exchanges have the authority to limit the usage of specific 
trading tactics.53
There is also a risk of procyclical behaviour when market participants begin to 
use similar AI and ML programmes.54 The consequent correlated risks may entail 
financial stability risks.55 If an ML-based trader outperforms others, this could in 
the future result in many more traders adopting similar ML strategies, even if this 
reduces the profitability of such strategies.56 While there is no evidence to date of 
this having occurred, it could become relevant as such trading strategies are increas-
ingly adopted. As with any herding behaviour in the market, this has the potential 
to amplify financial shocks. The main risk is the creation of procyclical behaviour 
that is harmful to financial stability.57 If regulators develop a preference for a robo-
adviser design that is understood by firms, it could result in a convergence of models 
that would increase the probability of a systemic crisis.58
2.2.3  The Same Approach to Peer‑to‑Peer Trading Platforms
Market safety and soundness regulations are aimed at providing financial stability 
and security to the users. In this section, the author uses the example of HFT to 
identify some of the risks to market stability of using AI. The main approaches to 
regulating activities and risks are internal systems and controls, self-assessment, and 
the reporting by both firms and trading venues.59 There are also specific require-
ments to deal with market crashes, liquidity risk, and correlated losses. In addition, 
traders using AI will need to fulfil their duties as market makers. To avoid similar 
losses, brokers and investor advisers using similar AI technology will need to be 
subject to the same systems and controls as those used for HFT. In the application 
of regulations for the use of AI on p2p trading platforms, market safety and mar-
ket integrity, alongside the access to finance, should continue to be the regulatory 
objectives. The risks, such as systemic risk, liquidity risk, and correlated risk, are 
the same as those on the capital market trading platforms. The difference lies in the 
55 Danielsson et al. (2017).
56 Shabbir and Anwer (2018).
57 Papaioannou et al. (2013).
58 Baker and Dellaert (2018), p 746.
59 Busch (2016).
51 Barrales (2012), p 1246.
52 Barrales (2012), p 1248.
53 Barrales (2012), p 1247.
54 Danielsson et al. (2017).
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methods of regulation. On the p2p platforms, organisational regulation is unlikely to 
be implemented for individual participants on the platforms. The regulatory empha-
sis will be more on requiring the trading platforms to vet individuals who use algo-
rithms to make transactions,60 to maintain the capacity to absorb the liquidity risk, 
and to have surveillance to control market manipulation. In fulfilling the objective of 
providing access to finance, the cost of maintaining the system should not be trans-
ferred to the users. If the cost of addressing these risks is too high, fewer platforms 
will be willing to operate. Hence, there should be ways to implement the systems of 
risks and control (organisational requirement) in a more economical way, such as by 
using certification systems to allow algorithmic uses on the platforms (an alterna-
tive way to submitting source code) and using RegTech solutions to monitor mar-
ket manipulation.61 In addition, the regulators can regulate the financial instruments 
(through product intervention power62) that could be used on the trading platforms.
3  Investor Protection
AI should give more freedom of choice as well as security to investors. It can enable 
access to finance by providing more economical investment advice to consumers 
who are excluded from accessing investment opportunities through a lack of infor-
mation. This presents an opportunity for the use of AI to provide services to con-
sumers for both execution or investment advice through, for example, robo-advis-
ers.63 When AI is consumer facing, such as in the use of robo-advisers or the use of 
AI by intermediaries for stock and fund selections, the focus of regulation is on both 
the ex ante (including reviewing the algorithmic models, Customer Due Diligence 
(CDD) and algorithm explication64) and the ex post protection of investors (com-
pensation and liability for AI65), especially retail investors. Hence, the main issues 
are the consumers’ understanding of the nature of AI (through algorithm explicabil-
ity66), the risk of using AI, and the liability associated with AI. Investors should also 
be protected in a fiduciary context: the providers of AI services have an obligation to 
act in the best interest of the customers and to present no conflict of interest.67
60 European Commission (2020), p 14 (Changes of concept to safety).
61 See 2.1, Technical methods in EU Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI (High-Level Expert Group on 
Artificial Intelligence 2019); also see Science and Technology Committee, House of Commons (2018); 
also see European Commission (2020), p 23.
62 Section 137D, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
63 Ji (2017).




739Access to Finance for Artificial Intelligence Regulation…
123
3.1  Using Robo‑Advisers to Close the Investment Advice Gap
There is no consensus on the definition of the financial advice gap.68 According to 
the definition given by the Financial Advice Market Review (FAMR), the finan-
cial advice gap refers to ‘situations in which consumers are unable to get advice 
and guidance on a need they have at a price they are willing to pay’.69 Cost is not 
the only factor causing this gap, and the financial advice gap should be defined as 
‘the difference between the number of people who currently seek advice, and those 
who would seek advice if a cheaper and less intensive process existed’.70 However, 
there is a common view that a gap exists for (potential) customers who have lower 
incomes or a lower level of assets and could either not afford the advisory fee or find 
it hard to access.71 The conclusion of the FAMR is that the underlying reason for the 
existence of the financial advice gap is that there are not sufficient financial advis-
ers since too many advisers are serving wealthy clients.72 According to the survey 
conducted by OpenMoney and YouGov, an increasing number of clients are falling 
into the financial advice gap.73 OpenMoney’s survey indicates that there are more 
than 400,000 people who believe they could not afford financial advice and over five 
million people who are not aware that there is free financial advice that could ben-
efit them.74 There are six million Britons who would be willing to pay for financial 
advice if the fee for that advice were lower.75
The role of robo-advisers such as Nutmeg and Wealthify is to fill this financial 
advice gap.76 Robo-advisers are a type of financial adviser that provides finan-
cial advice ‘in person’ or enables investment management online, with moderate 
to minimal human intervention. ‘Robo-advice’ is an umbrella term that refers to a 
broad spectrum of online automated tools and algorithms to determine financial or 
investment decisions for an individual’s portfolio. This process is based on financial 
analysis algorithms derived from mathematical rules. Progress through economic 
modelling and AI is the cornerstone of this technology. These algorithms are exe-
cuted by software and thus, taken to extremes, human intervention is not required.77 
Robo-advisers aim at reducing the cost of financial advisory services, increasing 
consumer protection by reducing conflicts of interest,78 providing better rational 
investment choices,79 and enabling more access to real-time information.80 Hence, 
68 Petrie (2017).
69 HM Treasury and FCA (2016).
70 HM Treasury and FCA (2016).
71 HM Treasury and FCA (2016).
72 HM Treasury and FCA (2016).
73 Rach (2019).
74 Rach (2019).








robo-advisers can enhance the access to finance and reducing the cost of financial 
access that leads to more affordable financial services.81 This effect would be highly 
beneficial for average savers who could access services that were previously inac-
cessible due to high commission fees.82
3.2  Risks of a Conflict of Interest, Unsuitable Products, and Design Errors
The use of robo-advisers may put an end to two related problems in the financial 
markets. Financial advisers tend to sell high commission-fee products because the 
advisers draw their income from their sale.83 Consequently, there is a conflict of 
interest between the investor and the adviser, who is also the broker.84 However, it 
is possible for the algorithms to be designed to avoid such a conflict.85 There is also 
a risk that robo-advisers may promote products that are not suitable for the particu-
lar investor. In addition, there is a risk that there may be algorithm design errors 
that can cause investor losses.86 There is clearly potential tension between the bro-
ker’s interests and the client’s interests.87 Robo-advisers may only be used to provide 
advice or recommendations, without performing the executions, although the users 
in these situations are likely to be guided to place orders through a specific product 
provider. For instance, Scalable Capital, an online robo-advice company, launched 
over-the-phone and face-to-face consultations for clients to select their investment 
portfolios based on their level of risk tolerance from a range of suggested advice.88 
Although financial institutions are responsible for damages caused to investors by 
using or relying on robo-advisers, there are some situations in which financial insti-
tutions are not responsible. These are the following: first, when financial institutions 
become insolvent and there is insufficient money cover to compensate investors; and 
second, when advice given was regarded merely as ‘guidance’ and the investor has 
autonomy to decide whether or not to accept it.89
3.3  Legal Framework for Protecting Investors
Access to finance requires a legal and regulatory framework to protect investors 
who use robo-advisers for personal or business finance. There are various legal tools 
that govern the relationship between financial institutions and investors, as well as 
between developers of AI and investors.
81 Philippon (2019).
82 Beioley (2019).
83 HM Treasury (2016); Final Report of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(2015).
84 Edwards (2018), p 97.




89 Stolper and Walter (2017).
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3.3.1  Contract
In the UK, investors are protected by common law, statutory law, and the regulators’ 
rules. Under common law, investors are protected through contract law, the duty of 
care under tort law, and the fiduciary duty provisions under the law of equity. In 
contract law, investors are protected by the terms under the contract as well as by 
the various principles including mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influ-
ence, and legality.90 Under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, they are also pro-
tected against unfair terms.91 Therefore, the use of AI devices by advisers should not 
violate these principles. Furthermore, if the investors are consumers, they will also 
be protected by consumer protection laws. However, contract law is unlikely to be 
an effective tool in providing protection to investors who do not have the capacity 
to appreciate the nature of AI, the performance of it, and whether AI is a suitable 
device for them to use for making investments.92 Increasingly, a contract will appear 
merely as evidence of the existence of an agreement for the conduct between finan-
cial advisers and their clients. Prior to investors’ use of AI, the terms of a contract 
between them and their advisers are unlikely to be negotiated between the parties. 
Investors are unlikely to be sophisticated enough to ask the financial advisers to dis-
close relevant information before they agree to accept the advice derived from the 
algorithms. Clients may not even be able to negotiate a specific term that requires 
their advisers to explain how particular products were selected for them.
3.3.2  Tort
In tort, the advisers should owe a duty of care to the investors,93 which entails ensur-
ing that in deploying AI for providing advice or even execution services, the advis-
ers’ behaviour does not fall short of a standard of care. The difficulty lies in how 
to identify an appropriate standard of care when using AI. There is currently no 
such standard set by either the financial services regulators or the industry.94 Even 
if the regulators have set out rules with which the investment advisers must comply, 
these rules do not necessarily form the standard of care that the court will apply in 
determining whether there is a breach.95 Relevant questions in setting the standard 
include: which AI devices are suitable for the client? what kind of data should be 
fed into an AI device to produce investment advice? what kind of warning should be 
given to investors? what kind of assistance should be given to investors? what kind 
of explanation should be given to investors about the outcome of the algorithms?
90 Cartwright (2006).
91 Art. 2 (Negligence Liability), Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.
92 Goodman and Flaxman (2017).





3.3.3  Fiduciary Duty
The core of the fiduciary duty is both the duty of loyalty and the duty of good faith.96 
Under the duty of loyalty, investor advisers should not put their interests in conflict 
with those of their clients.97 This duty should not be removed by contract,98 as fidu-
ciary duties may generally be altered or restricted by agreement between the par-
ties.99 In practical terms, advisers need to use their best endeavours to find a suitable 
investment product for their clients100 rather than offering products that will reward 
them with a commission. Compared with the duty of care, the fiduciary duty applies 
in more limited circumstances. The fiduciary duty prohibits financial advisers from 
acting in a disloyal or improper way, i.e. it is a negative obligation.101 However, the 
duty of care requires financial advisers to act competently and not recklessly, i.e. it 
is a positive obligation compared with the fiduciary duty.102 When used in execut-
ing the clients’ request, AI should be used to fulfil the advisers’ duty of best execu-
tion.103 While price discrimination is a common practice in market transactions, the 
fiduciary duty is insufficient to remove such a risk.
3.3.4  Consumer Protection Is Key
Access to finance will require stronger consumer protection to increase consum-
ers’ willingness to use robo-advisers. Relying on an ex post regime based on com-
mon law is ineffective in providing protection to investors. The FCA stated104 that if 
robo-advisers filter products and propose them based upon specific factors relating 
to a customer’s life and/or situation, this amounts to a personal recommendation. 
Therefore, the entire set of laws related to consumer protection would apply. Con-
sumers are usually deemed to be vulnerable, as they do not understand the mecha-
nisms working in financial markets and also because they cannot fully understand 
the advice provided.105 As an experimentation space, a ‘sandbox’ would provide a 
more suitable environment for the emerging technologies.106 Firms could then test a 
new business model built on Fintech without fearing the demanding scrutiny of the 
FCA.107 However, it would not be sufficient to use a sandbox to protect consumers. 
96 Bristol and West Building Society v. Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18.
97 Bristol and West Building Society v. Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18.
98 Recommendation 7, Kay (2012).
99 FCA (2018c).
100 Law Commission (2014).
101 Law Commission (2013b).
102 Law Commission (2013b).
103 Lightbourne (2017).
104 Baker and Dellaert (2018).
105 Edwards (2018), p 97.
106 FCA (2017b).
107 Ringe and Ruof (2018).
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In the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged two robo-advis-
ers with making false disclosures.108
3.3.5  Product Liability
The institutions, i.e. investment firms, are responsible for damages caused to, or 
profits gained from investors. As the institutions will be deploying the AI devices, 
the current law specifies that they are responsible for damages caused to inves-
tors,109 even though the AI devices have been developed by third parties, i.e. a tech 
company. In line with the approaches taken in the area of algorithmic trading, insti-
tutions using algorithmic trading are responsible for the effects caused and for the 
initial and continued testing of the algorithms.110 However, the investor liability 
that the third parties should assume is not simply a matter for debate. The financial 
institutions could be insolvent, and there might be inadequate funding to compen-
sate investors, whether provided through insurance or the government’s scheme of 
compensation. There might be an issue of how investors may hold the third-party 
developers responsible for losses.111 In the realm of product liability, third parties 
are strictly liable for consumer losses.112 However, AI is not a product and may not 
be used or operated by the consumers themselves. More often than not, AI devices 
are a set of algorithms (software) used by financial institutions to provide advice 
or execution for clients. Should the computer scientists and tech developers be 
responsible for mistakes in the design of the algorithms? The general answer lies 
in the product liability of the software.113 The more specific question is whether AI 
developers should be responsible for any damages caused by the design of AI. The 
same question also arises in automated vehicles114 and defence software.115 The EU 
Directive 1985116 imposes strict liability on all parties in the supply chain for defec-
tive products, whether or not the defect arose from negligence. The UK law117 that 
embodies this directive is not clear on whether software is a product: the application 
of this law to software might cause a floodgate risk, and due to the widespread use 
of software, a legal finding that software providers are at fault could lead to unlim-
ited liability.
108 SEC (2018).
109 Cerka et al. (2015).
110 FCA (2019).
111 Ji (2017).
112 Section 2(1), Consumer Protection Act 1987.
113 European Commission (2020), p 14.
114 Kim (2018).
115 Vihul (2014).
116 EU Directive 85/374/EEC on liability for defective products (Product Liability Directive) [1985] OJ 
L 210/29.
117 Part 1, Consumer Protection Act 1987.
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3.4  Regulating Robo‑Advisers to Achieve Access to Finance
To enhance financial inclusion through the use of robo-advisers, the AI solutions 
used must not be inferior to those given and used by wealth management providers 
to offer services to wealthier clients.118 The major challenge of retail investors is to 
make informed decisions based on market information, such as fundamental aspects 
of companies, the industry specificities, market competition, and macro-economic 
conditions. Average investors are not normally equipped with professional exper-
tise or the time to collect and analyse these data. By contrast, the wealthier inves-
tors with the help of professional financial advisers could make better data-driven 
investment decisions. In the UK, after a free introductory session, typical independ-
ent financial advisers’ fees are £450 for advice in a £11,000 investment asset scale; 
and £1,500 for investment strategy advice for a £50,000 inheritance.119 AI should 
be used to level the playing field.120 The World Bank’s research indicates that the 
asset amount under the management of robo-advisers will be tripled in the US from 
426 billion US Dollars in 2018 to 1,486 billion in 2023.121 For retail investors, robo-
advisers are in place to reduce minimum investment requirements, even to no mini-
mum investment criteria at all, as in the case of Betterment, and to charge lower 
fees, normally 0.25% of managed assets for robo-advisers and 0.75–1.5% of man-
aged assets for human advisers. This is because robo-advisers save on fixed costs, 
such as the salaries of financial advisers, and reduce behavioural biases, such as lim-
ited capacity to manage and invest in various categories of assets.122 The Bank of 
America requires $25,000 US to create an account with private financial advisers, 
compared with $5000 US to create an account with robo-advisers.123 In addition, 
robo-advisers can easily be accessed at any time and from anywhere.124
In terms of redress, consumers are less likely to bargain for their terms and are 
less likely to bring law suits to recover compensation, due to the excessive costs of 
bringing lawsuits.125 Therefore, there must be more ex ante control in the design, 
development, and deployment of the robo-advisers used, and a more robust com-




121 The World Bank (2019).
122 The World Bank (2019).
123 The World Bank (2019).
124 The World Bank (2019).
125 Polinsky and Shavell (2010).
126 Scherer (2016); Lea (2015).
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4  AI as RegTech
4.1  RegTech and SupTech in Financial Markets
Since AI can streamline KYC/CDD processes to reduce the compliance costs of 
financial intermediaries,127 more investment firms could be set up to provide ser-
vices to investors. This would increase market competition and allow more financial 
innovation and thereby provide better access to finance for consumers and investors. 
AI devices can be used to detect conduct that violates market integrity, such as mar-
ket manipulation including price fixing, disinformation, insider dealing, and money 
laundering. AI devices can be used by financial institutions, regulators, policy-
makers, or even private market watchdogs to detect and prevent such misconduct. 
When devices are used for this purpose, they are dubbed ‘regulatory technology’ 
(RegTech).128 RegTech will also include SupTech that is mainly used for the pur-
pose of market supervision.129 When RegTech is used to detect market misconduct, 
it involves elements of market surveillance that include the collection of individual 
data.130 In this situation, the value of protecting individual rights and dignity may 
conflict with market integrity and public interest. For instance, an anti-money laun-
dering regime requires financial intermediaries to screen personal data. However, 
this may be in contravention with the spirit of the General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR).131 The main objective of RegTech is to protect market integrity. AI 
has been used as a SupTech service by exchanges,132 in providing supervision and as 
a RegTech service by financial institutions,133 for compliance purposes. In addition 
to ensuring the previously mentioned appropriate design modes in investor protec-
tion, another emerging concern is the need for data governance that ensures privacy 
protection and data protection.134 In this case, to ensure market integrity, data on 
individuals can be collected that relates to law enforcement-related activities, such 
as insider dealing, market manipulation, and money laundering.135 Personal data, 
transaction/order book data, communications and suspicious transaction and order 
reports (STORs) are collected for market oversight.136
The collection of personal data for RegTech may violate data protection rules and 
privacy rights.137 While consent is required for controlling and processing data, data 
127 Kingston (2017).
128 According to the definition given by FCA, ‘RegTech applies to new technologies developed to help 
overcome regulatory challenges in financial services’. FCA (2017a).
129 Armstrong (2018).
130 Broeders and Prenio (2018).
131 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1.
132 Polinsky and Shavell (2010).
133 Information Commissioner’s Office (2017).
134 European Commission (2018).
135 FCA (2018a)
136 FCA (2018a).
137 Information Commissioner’s Office (2019b).
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collected for market integrity can be processed and transferred without the consent 
of the individual.138 That is to say, individuals may not have the right to prevent the 
unauthorized sharing of their personal information in accordance with the GDPR 
and Data Protection Act 2018.139 The right of privacy can be violated when personal 
data are collected for the development and deployment of RegTech.
4.2  AI and Anti‑Money Laundering (AML)
Some regulators are using AI for fraud and anti-money laundering and countering 
the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) detection.140 It is possible, for example, that 
ML algorithms could detect suspicious transactions and provide a risk score for such 
transactions through supervised learning.141 In addition, ML could be applied to 
screen known criminals, individuals and institutions who are on the global ‘black-
list’ and forecast the likelihood of money laundering.142 Furthermore, unsupervised 
ML allows it to summarise the characteristics of variables and to tag them based 
on certain criteria established by unsupervised learning.143 That is to say, through 
unsupervised ML, financial institutions and regulatory authorities could identify the 
behavioural characteristics of financial crimes, including money laundering. The 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has been exploring the 
quality of results and the potential use of Natural Language Process (NLP) technol-
ogy to identify and extract entities of interest from evidentiary documents.144 ASIC 
is using NLP and other technology to visualise and explore the extracted entities and 
their relationships. To fight criminal activities carried out through the banking sys-
tem (such as money laundering), detailed information on bank transfers is collected 
and this information is correlated with information from newspaper articles.145 Sim-
ilarly, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) is exploring the use of AI and 
ML in the analysis of suspicious transactions to identify those transactions that war-
rant further attention,146 allowing supervisors to focus their resources on higher risk 
transactions. Investigating suspicious transactions is time-consuming. Regulated 
entities use defensive filings to protect themselves,147 and this leads to a high rate 
of false positives.148 ML is being used to identify complex patterns and highlight 
suspicious transactions that are potentially more serious and warrant closer investi-
gation.149 Coupled with ML methods to analyse the granular data from transactions, 










148 Financial Action Task Force and Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (2016).
149 Financial Action Task Force and Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (2016).
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client profiles, and a variety of unstructured data, ML is being explored to uncover 
non-linear relationships among different attributes and entities and to detect poten-
tially complicated behaviour patterns of money laundering and terrorism financing 
that are not directly observable through suspicious transaction filings from individ-
ual entities.150
4.3  KYC of Fund and Asset Management
Funds and other methods of investment, such as AIFs (alternative investment funds), 
attract a large number of organisations and individuals to invest. When individual 
investors or corporations make investments, they may also be requested to provide 
their personal information—including their names, address, date of birth, contact 
information, related anti-money laundering information, documents of income cer-
tification, payment details for dividend and redemption proceeds, and tax residence 
information. They are collected for different purposes, such as identification or to 
guarantee an obligation.151 Thus, personal information is being controlled, pro-
cessed and stored not only by investment fund companies, management companies 
or transfer agencies but also by the directors of these companies or other third-party 
agencies working for them.
To guarantee the security of fund transactions, MiFID II requires fund compa-
nies to reinforce six aspects of data collection.152 For example, to prevent money 
laundering, customers may be asked to provide a certification of income. Further-
more, the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds Regula-
tions 2017 require firms to maintain the safe custody of assets belonging to their 
clients.153 Under these regulations, firms should establish and keep records for at 
least 5 years with as much detail as possible.154 This includes personal information 
regarding relationships, order handlings, reports, assets and so forth.155 However, 
GDPR authorizes the right of data subjects to have their personal data erased with-
out delay.156 The data subject has the right to demand the information controller to 
erase personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the information 
controller has an obligation to do so.157 This principle conflicts with the MiFID II 
principle that requires a firm to retain all records kept by it in relation to its MiFID 
business for a period of at least 5 years.158 The purpose of the information collected 






155 Varney and Malna (2018).
156 Art. 17, GDPR.
157 Art. 17(1), GDPR.
158 FCA’s Systems and Control Sourcebook 9.1.2.
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obligations, for developing new products, or for research purposes such as develop-
ing RegTech?
4.4  Streamlining Compliance Processes
The KYC process is often costly, laborious, and highly duplicative, covering many 
services and institutions.159 According to Thomson Reuters, some major financial 
institutions spend 500 million US dollars on KYC and CDD annually; the annual 
spending of 10% of the world’s top financial institutions is at least 100 million dol-
lars and the average is 48 million dollars globally.160 ML is increasingly used in 
the remote KYC processes of financial services firms to perform identity and back-
ground pre-checks. For example, applying AI in the process of KYC could detect 
any attempt to use fake documents to perform KYC in real time. AI could com-
plete the facial, documental and any other verifications in real time in a single cycle. 
Hence, AI helps financial institutions to perform AML background checking in real 
time to avoid unwanted regulatory scrutiny and monetary fines.161 ML is predomi-
nantly used in two ways: (1) evaluating whether images in identifying documents 
match one another, and (2) calculating the risk scores on which firms determine 
which individuals or applications need to receive additional scrutiny. ML-based 
risk scores are also used in ongoing periodic checks based on public and other data 
sources, such as police registers of offenders and social media services.162 The use 
of these sources may enable risk and trust to be assessed quickly and cheaply.163 
Firms can use risk scores on the probability of customers raising ‘red flags’ on KYC 
checks to help make decisions on whether to proceed with the time and expense of 
a full background check. Nonetheless, concerns about the tools’ accuracy have kept 
some financial services from incorporating them. Research is needed to discover 
how regulators accept this kind of approach and what their worries are.
4.5  Public Interest and Individual Right
For public enforcement agencies, such as the National Crime Agency, the Serious 
Fraud Office, FCA, and policing agencies, current data protection law aimed at pro-
tecting individual sensitive data does not prevent them from collecting that informa-
tion for the purpose of law enforcement, such as ensuring the security of citizens.164 
Furthermore, the current law does not prevent public agencies or financial institu-
tions from collecting individual data in the public domain, and that can help them 






164 Art. 6.1(c and f), GDPR; Information Commissioner’s Office (2019a); European Commission (2020).
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of suspicious transactions.165 However, the ethical foundations of individual profil-
ing for market surveillance have not yet been robustly established.166 The identifica-
tion of the parameters for agencies—either public or private—to carry out individ-
ual profiling will need to be built on human rights and human dignity principles167 
to ensure not only individual safety but also societal safety.168 Such profiling infor-
mation could fall into the wrong hands and be used maliciously.169
Individual consent is inadequate in protecting the individual for the following rea-
sons: first, a person, as a general principle, cannot consent to be harmed;170 second, 
the individual may not appreciate the risk;171 and third, the individual may not know 
to what he or she is consenting.172 Hence, there is also a need to redefine individual 
consent: the method of consent, the purpose of consent, and the possible revision 
and withdrawal of consent.173
Even for KYC processes conducted for the purpose of protecting the individual, 
such as assessing the clients’ risk appetite in accordance with the clients’ suitabil-
ity rules,174 the consent to individual profiling is also problematic. The problem 
can arise in data quality and accuracy that can affect the quality and accuracy of 
profiling.175 The data could be collected via social media and other smart devices. 
These integrated datasets containing information about an individual, possibly with 
extended information, can easily be seized by third parties through a legal request, 
e.g. a request from a foreign government.176 Since clients did not consent to the 
sharing of their datasets with third party government agencies, transferring these 
data or providing government agencies access to those datasets may have prejudicial 
effects on the individuals’ rights in the legal process.177 For instance, the original 
data collector, even if fully complying with statutory obligations initially, will still 
breach its legal obligations if it shares data with the next public authority to process 
165 Art. 6.1(e), GDPR; also see PWC (2014).
166 Information Commissioner’s Office (2010).
167 Bernal (2016).
168 Hoven (2010); EU Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI (High-Level Expert Group on Artificial 
Intelligence 2019). See Respect for democracy, justice and the rule of law; and the Principle of Preven-
tion of Harm.
169 Ahmed (2014).
170 Tadros (2011). The Principle of Prevention of Harm under EU Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI 
(High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence 2019). The validity of consent to harm depends on 
the content of what is consented to and it is valid in some circumstances; also see Boddington (2017), pp 
90–92.
171 Humerick (2018), p 405.
172 Humerick (2018), pp 405, 406.
173 Humerick (2018), p 407.
174 Tadros (2011). The Principle of Prevention of Harm under EU Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI 
(High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence 2019). The validity of consent to harm depends on 
the content of what is consented to and it is valid in some circumstances; Sarangi and Sharma (2018).
175 Sherman (2015).
176 European Commission (2020), p 18. Intrusive surveillance technologies would be considered ‘high 
risk’.
177 Law Commission (2013a).
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these data further, unless the first collector provided a detailed explanation of the 
further sharing of the data and obtained consent at the time of collection.178
4.6  Policy Recommendation
In this article, the author has looked at the regulatory objectives and regulatory 
methods associated with management systems and processes where AI has been 
deployed in securities trading and investment services. The author uses HFT as 
an example to examine how AI is regulated on a trading platform that is not con-
sumer facing. The primary regulatory objective is to deal with systemic risk—flash 
crashes, liquidity risks, and procyclical behaviour. The secondary objective is inves-
tor protection (fairness) against market manipulation. The main regulatory approach 
is the requirement that operators—HFT specialist firms, securities firms, proprietary 
traders, and trading venues—have internal risk management systems and processes. 
In this way, these operators are also required to consider market safety and market 
integrity. Whether HFTs should disclose algorithms to the regulators remains a con-
tentious issue, and the UK regulators do not require such disclosure. The regulatory 
objective of market safety is appropriate as the basis for continuing the regulation of 
AI for trading platforms. However, HFT firms, securities firms, and trading venues 
are all being subjected to a higher degree of control by regulators. These methods 
of regulation may not be appropriate for newcomers in the development of AI Fin-
Tech services provided on p2p trading platforms. The new p2p trading platforms, 
either on a distributed ledger technology (DLT) network or on Amazon-like ones, 
will need more consumer protection including price discrimination and privacy 
rights’ protection. In a p2p trading platform where consumers trade securities, the 
same regulatory objectives of market safety and market integrity should apply. The 
platform providers who use algorithms to execute client transactions, such as dis-
tributing their portfolios, need to ensure the protection of clients. To ensure there 
is no market manipulation behaviour, including price manipulation and price dis-
crimination, the platform providers will also need to bear the burden of identifying 
those who use algorithms to trade or allocate securities. Unlike regulated trading 
platforms, the users of p2p platforms are likely to be individuals who rely on algo-
rithms developed for interactions on the platforms. It is unlikely that individuals will 
have the capacity to implement risk management systems and controls. Therefore, 
to increase financial inclusion, the onus will be on the trading platform to monitor 
operations and to set the parameters of where these algorithms will operate. There 
should be an effective mechanism to exclude anybody from participating in the plat-
forms who is found to be using algorithms to cause systemic problems or to manipu-
late the market.
Section 3 discussed the protection of investors from asset managers and invest-
ment advisers who are using AI. Since asset managers and investor advisers 
(even online ones) are more consumer facing, more protection should be given to 
178 O’Shea (2015) and Cath (2018).
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investors, particularly retail and consumer investors, to increase their willingness to 
use robo-advisers to manage their assets. It is unlikely that investors will be able to 
negotiate contractual terms that serve to protect them against potential harm such as 
misleading information and price discrimination. The standard of care under tort law 
in financial services is an unstable concept for investors to use to claim redress. Fur-
thermore, it is not clear whether a fiduciary duty can be assumed by robo-advisers or 
by advisers using algorithms.179 Fiduciary duties can also be altered and restricted 
by parties. A fiduciary duty concerns what a fiduciary (investment adviser) cannot 
do (conflict of interest) rather than should do (act in the best interest of the client).
Therefore, using common law principles to provide protection to consumer 
investors would be inadequate, particularly if AI aims to provide access to finance 
and to close the advice gap where less wealthy investors do not have access to the 
same advice services as the wealthier. Wealthier investors are not only able to rely 
on common law principles to control the level of their protection but are also more 
likely to make complaints and bring lawsuits. It is more likely that statutory protec-
tion based on policy will provide consumers with protection that can balance the 
need of closing the advice gap with that of financial innovation. For instance, the 
‘best interest’ principle and the suitability principle should continue to apply to the 
use of AI for providing advice on execution and investment. Detriments to consum-
ers’ welfare such as price discrimination—wealthier clients’ investments are sold at 
a higher price—should also be factored in.
In terms of user protection, the more problematic situation is the one in which 
an AI investment advice tool is provided online—freely downloadable—and can be 
used on the providers’ platform or other platforms. These tools may not have been 
developed in-house by the investment firms. The advice may simply provide free 
guidance. In this situation, it is difficult to argue that there is a fiduciary relationship 
between a firm using robo-advisers and consumers/investors. There can also be a 
question about whether a contract is formed if the robo-advisers provide free invest-
ment guidance. Furthermore, it is likely that the software will continue to be treated 
as a ‘non-product’, hence product liability rules do not apply. These factors could 
leave investors relying on robo-advisers without adequate protection.
Rather than traditional investment services, consumers may use online robo-
advisers to purchase financial products that might otherwise be unavailable to them, 
because they do not have access to the information that wealth management advis-
ers provide. With open data and the development of more sophisticated algorithms, 
users may select online advisers that provide more economic services for advice and 
investment portfolio management. Consumers should be protected against poorly 
developed algorithms that do not act in their best interest, that are prejudiced against 
them, or that cause damage through errors.180
In Sect. 4, the focus was on using AI in RegTech or SupTech solutions for pre-
venting, detecting, and controlling financial crime, such as money laundering. Due 
to the cost of compliance, many online financial firms are prohibited from giving 
179 Degeling and Hudson (2018).
180 European Commission (2020), p 12.
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financial advice, especially if they process transactions on behalf of clients or if they 
provide p2p investment platforms. RegTech will streamline the KYC/CDD pro-
cesses and hence reduce their compliance costs. This, in turn, will allow more firms 
to come to the market to offer services. The regulatory objective of market integrity 
directly conflicts with the privacy rights of individuals and data protection laws. It 
is submitted that data governance will need to be established to protect individual 
rights but also societal safety.
5  Conclusion
AI will bring benefits and risks to the financial services sector. To ensure continuity, 
market safety, investor protection, and market integrity should continue to guide the 
regulation of AI. In addition to these, access to finance should be a regulatory objec-
tive so that AI can be used not only to benefit financial intermediaries but also to 
provide a larger social benefit to those previously excluded from financial opportu-
nities. Access to finance will help the use and regulation of AI to gain wider public 
acceptance. For this objective, AI can be used to help the optimisation of capital 
on p2p platforms, to help consumers to have cheaper access to more information 
through robo-advisers, and through the use of RegTech services to streamline KYC/
CDD processes, hence reducing compliance costs. More detailed rules need to be 
developed to certify good algorithms and good platforms, to strengthen ex ante and 
increase ex post the protection of individuals who use robo-advisers, and to address 
how individual rights, such as privacy rights and data rights, can be protected to 
allow the conducting of more efficient KYC processes.
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